As previously addressed on this blog, the New York Legislature enacted a Medical Aid in Dying Act in June of 2025 allowing a physician to issue a prescription for lethal medication to be self-administered by a patient who has been diagnosed with a terminal condition expected to lead to death within six months. After working with the Legislature to make certain changes to the bill, New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed it into law on February 6, 2026. One revision was to change the provision that the law “shall take effect immediately” to an effective date six months after signing, allowing the Department of Health to adopt regulations to implement the law and allowing healthcare facilities to properly prepare and train staff for compliance.
In advance of the August 5, 2026, effective date, a lawsuit was filed on June 11, 2026, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (EDNY) on behalf of people with life-threatening disabilities claiming discrimination and seeking to invalidate the Act and enjoin the State of New York defendants from enforcing it. The lawsuit alleges that Medical Aid in Dying is a “deadly and discriminatory system that steers people with life threatening disabilities away from necessary lifesaving and preserving mental health care, medical care, and disability supports, and toward death by suicide under the guise of “mercy” and “dignity” in dying.”
Governor Hochul, the New York State Department of Health, the State Board for Medicine, the State Office of Mental Health, and their respective commissioners are named as defendants in the lawsuit. The lead plaintiff is the Brooklyn Center for Independence of the Disabled, joined by seven other not-for-profit organizations that either provide services to people with disabilities or advocate for the interests of people with disabilities. Two disabled individuals are also plaintiffs in the action – one suffers from a spinal cord injury that leaves him paralyzed from the neck down with limited movement of his arms, and the other is a woman with multiple sclerosis and congenital cerebellar ataxia who is wheelchair bound and almost completely blind.
The grounds asserted in the complaint were that (a) the Act violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act; (b) the Act violates Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (c) the Act violates Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act; (d) the Act is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Article I, Section 11 of the New York State Constitution; and (e) the Act is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution.
The complaint was filed along with a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on an ex parte basis without notice to any of the defendants. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1), a court may issue temporary restraints without written or oral notice to the adverse party “if specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury” will occur before the adverse party can be heard in opposition. On June 15, 2026, the court sua sponte denied the TRO, noting that while plaintiffs alleged they would suffer irreparable harm if the Act went into effect, because the Act would not take effect until August 5, no irreparable harm would occur before the defendants could be heard in opposition. The court set the matter for a hearing on a preliminary injunction application on June 25, 2026. The New York Attorney General filed opposition to the request for a preliminary injunction, arguing that none of the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case, and addressing the substantive arguments as lacking merit. Judge Orelia Merchant heard oral argument at the June 25 hearing but reserved decision.
The action in the EDNY is one of a series of challenges brought by disability advocates challenging the validity of medical aid-in-dying laws. The same day that the EDNY lawsuit was filed, a nearly identical lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, challenging the Illinois Medical Aid in Dying Act, which was signed into law by Governor JB Pritzker on December 12, 2025, with a September 12, 2026, effective date. A responsive pleading on behalf of the defendants in that case has not yet been filed.
The earliest of these related lawsuits was filed in California on April 25, 2023, challenging that state’s End of Life Options Act, which was enacted in 2016 and amended in 2021. In an unpublished opinion issued on March 27, 2024, the District Court for the Central District of California held that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to advance their discrimination claims. At the same time, however, it concluded that the organizational plaintiffs had associational standing, but that the plaintiffs did not state a claim for relief under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or the constitutional provisions for due process and equal protection.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard oral argument on March 25, 2025. Rather than rule immediately, the court decided to hold the matter in abeyance pending a final decision in the en banc matter of Arizona Alliance of Retired Americans v. Mayes. That case concerns the subject of associational standing following the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, which rejected the legal theory that standing can be based on frustration of an organization’s mission and diversion of resources. Although relevant to the standing issue, Arizona Alliance is otherwise unrelated to medical aid in dying.
After the enactment of the Colorado End of Life Options Act in 2016, followed by an expansion of the categories of healthcare professionals who could provide medical aid in dying in 2024, an individual patient, along with a similar coalition of disability advocacy groups, challenged the statute in June of 2025 as violating federal disability rights laws and federal constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. A motion to dismiss was referred by the district judge to the magistrate for review and recommendation. In a written report dated March 31, 2026, the magistrate judge concluded that neither the individual plaintiff nor any of the organizational plaintiffs had standing to pursue these claims and recommended that the complaint be dismissed. Objections to the recommendation were filed and are awaiting disposition by the district judge.
The last case in this series concerns the Delaware End of Life Options Act, which was signed into law on May 20, 2025, with an effective date of January 1, 2026. A complaint with virtually identical disability-discrimination claims, made by many of the same organizations as in the EDNY lawsuit, was filed on December 8, 2025. Along with the complaint, plaintiffs moved for a TRO to enjoin implementation of the Delaware Act. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, challenging both the merits of the plaintiffs’ grounds for a TRO and whether any of the plaintiffs had standing under Article III of the Constitution to seek such relief. The District Court held that all plaintiffs lacked standing, and that even if they had standing, the application for a TRO failed on the merits and was dismissed. On January 2, 2026, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The case is still being briefed. Oral argument has not yet been scheduled.
The plaintiffs in these cases include a recurring core group of organizations: the United Spinal Association, Not Dead Yet, and the Institute for Patients’ Rights. More recently, the National Council on Independent Living has joined in this litigation.
The District Court decisions so far have rejected the disability discrimination claims. The primary ground for dismissal is the lack of standing. However, some courts have analyzed the merits of the claim. It remains to be seen what approach the Eastern District judge utilizes.
The plaintiffs’ claim of discrimination arises out of the way in which they apply the statutory definition of “terminal illness” with an assertion that, with these conditions, they are at risk of being denied medical treatment and instead “steered” toward physician-assisted suicide. The term “terminal illness or condition” is defined in the Act as “an incurable and irreversible illness or condition that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months, whether or not treatment is provided.” From the face of the Complaint, the individual plaintiffs do not meet the eligibility threshold to receive medical aid in dying. Under the Act, it is not enough that an illness or condition would be terminal if medical treatment were withdrawn or withheld; it must result in death within six months, even if treatment were provided. The allegations of the Complaint indicate that each of the individual plaintiffs has lived with their conditions for many years, with no allegation of imminent death. The New Jersey Franciscan Friar Benedict Groeschel reportedly observed “We’ve all got a terminal illness. It’s called life.”
Title II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination.” Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act similarly provides that “no otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” These provisions are reinforced by Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, which provides that “an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under [Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act], be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance.” There are also non-discrimination provisions in Title III of the ADA concerning places of public accommodation.
Courts in the Second Circuit have routinely addressed claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ACA using the same liability analysis. The plaintiffs’ argument that they are discriminatorily excluded from suicide prevention services and are instead steered to suicide through medical aid in dying has a fatal flaw. Nothing in the New York Medical Aid in Dying Act denies individuals access to suicide prevention services. Those services remain available. A person seeking the option of medical aid in dying does so voluntarily.
It has been over 30 years since Oregon enacted its Death with Dignity Act as the first instance of medical aid in dying. According to a 2024 Gallup Poll, the percentage of Americans believing doctors should be allowed to provide medical aid in dying at the patient’s request has increased to 66%. Major medical associations, however, have resisted endorsing the practice. The matter remains controversial and likely will always be so.
Guidance on disability discrimination may be forthcoming from either the Ninth or Third Circuit soon. When the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Bryman v. Murphy, upholding the residency requirement in the New Jersey Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act, it noted there was “no easy answer” concerning the policy choices involved in medical aid in dying. The New Jersey legislature had limited doctors’ assistance to prescribing medication that the patient self-administers, along with safeguards like waiting periods between the request and the prescription and bans on insurance companies and other third parties writing contracts that pressure patients to follow through once they ask to die. The point of such safeguards is to help protect terminally ill New Jerseyans from undue influence and preserve their right of choice around self-determination.








